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Trial Calendar Preference
Frank G. Homan*
T ODAY'S CROWDED COURT DOCKETS and delays often prevent
cases from being reached until years after the action is
filed. This is particularly true in the large urban areas of the
country. For example, in 1961 the worst court congestion was
Chicago with a 64.9 month delay. Next was Nassau County, Long
Island, New York with 62 months; followed by Westchester
County, New York, 51 months; New York City with 34 months;
Pittsburgh with 33 months; and Philadelphia 30 months.' Here
in Cuyahoga County, of which Cleveland is the county seat, we
were about 16 to 18 months behind. In 1961 there was a net gain
of 36 cases in reducing the backlog. At this rate the courts will
probably become current in a hundred years.2
However, under some circumstances it may be possible to
obtain a trial more quickly by a motion for preference on the trial
calendar.
Parenthetically, this article does not refer to the criminal
courts, where the accused is constitutionally guaranteed a "speedy
trial." 3
One of the best ways to secure a prompt hearing is in those
jurisdictions which maintain a short cause calendar. If it appears
that a trial will occupy only a short time, such as one or two
hours, it can be placed on the short cause calendar, and it will
be heard more speedily than if it were placed in order on the
regular docket.4
Just what kind of cases can be given preference is mentioned
specifically in the statutes of many states. Connecticut, for ex-
ample, gives preference to six different types of action, ranging
from summary process, to actions by persons who are 65 years or
older or who will reach that age during the pendency of the ac-
* B.A., M.A., Univ. of Pennsylvania, Fourth-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 Report of Institute of Judicial Administration (New York City) in Cleve-
land Plain Dealer, p. 1 (Aug. 8, 1961).
2 85 N. J. Law J. 508 (Sept. 27, 1962).
3 Constitution of the United States, Amend. VI; Constitution of Ohio,
Art. 1-10 (1912).
4 Black's Law Dictionary, 1548 (1951).
5 Gives lessor means to recover premises from lessee whose lease has
expired,
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tion.° New York's Rules of Civil Procedure permit preference in
cases in which the state or any political subdivision thereof is in-
volved, or any action "in which the interests of justice be served
by an early trial." 7 Louisiana also gives preference on the
docket to those cases in which the state or any political subdivi-
sion may be a party, as well as to all actions for damages arising
"ex delicto" or as torts.8 Ohio grants preference to any action to
which the state is a party, actions for wages, and workmen's
compensation cases.9 California allows preference to any person
interested under a deed, will, or other written instrument, in
water course cases, and to one claiming to be a non-resident for
income tax purposes.'0
Most of the states specifically give preference on the docket
to cases in which the state itself or any political subdivision
thereof is a party. However, this is also a common law right, for
preference and sovereignty are inherent possessions of the sov-
ereign, of which it could not be deprived except by express
legislation. Definitions as to what is a "political subdivision" have
led to problems involving the proliferation of boards and com-
missions found today. The courts have upheld the grants of
6 Conn. Gen. Stat. Anno., Title 52-192 (1958).
(a) Cases of summary process.
(b) Objections to acceptance of a report of a committee or auditor or
award of an abritrator.
(c) Appeals from probate.
(d) Actions by receivers of insolvent corporations.
(e) Actions by persons 65 years of age or older, etc.
(f) Partitions and foreclosure cases.
7 N. Y. Rev. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 151 (1956).
(a) Actions brought by or against the state--or board of officers of the
state.
(b) An action or special proceeding in which the interests of justice
will be served by an early trial.
8 McGinn v. New Orleans Railway and Light Co., 118 La. 811, 43 S. 452,
13 L. R. A. N. S. 601 (1907), cited in West's Louisiana Statutes Anno.
§ 13:4157 (1950).
(a) Cases in which the state or any political subdivision may be a
party.
(b) Interdiction appeals (person who became insane, incapable of con-
trolling his own interests and placed under control of a guardian).
(c) Contest for political office.
(d) Those affecting the public interest or fiscal policy.
(e) Constitutionality or legality of any tax which delays its collection.
(f) Putting of heirs in possession.
(g) Demands for separation from husband and wife.
9 Page's Ohio Rev. Code § 2311.08 (1953).
10 West's Calif. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1060-1062 (1954).
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priority to these various boards even if they are not officially
designated by the title of "Board." 11
In the absence of any specific statutes listing which cases are
entitled to calendar preference, the trial court, under its own
rules of procedure can advance or prefer certain cases, relying
on its own discretion and the best interests of justice.12
Trial preference is jealously guarded by the courts and oc-
curs only where circumstances are unusual.13 Trial preference,
though discretionary with the court, has led to some judicial in-
terpretations as to whether the court has wide, reasonable or
broad discretion. In one case the trial court consolidated two
separate but related causes of action for trial, and upon objection
by one of the defendants the Washington Supreme Court held
that the question whether or not cases should be consolidated
was a matter lying entirely within the discretion of the trial
court to arrange its calendar and determine in what manner the
cases could be heard most expeditiously. 1 4 Obviously, as a case
may be consolidated and thus heard out of its regular turn, this
in itself constitutes a preference.
In another case the petitioner claimed that the circuit court
was refusing to hear this petition inasmuch as it had not been
assigned a date for trial. The Supreme Court of Indiana merely
noted that the courts may exercise a "reasonable discretion" in
the control of their dockets and refused to order the lower court
to set a trial date. 15
Preference in the federal courts is governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 16 Cases in which the Federal Govern-
ment is a party, where the public interest is strongly involved, 7
or cases of great hardship if trial is delayed, are entitled to
preference.' 8 In a civil rights case the plaintiff, a Negro, alleged
that he was denied admission to the law school of the University
11 Sullivan v. Republic Steel Corp., 85 N. E. 2d 310 (Ohio 1948).
12 53 Am. Jur., Trial, p. 30.
13 Superior Court of N. J., Rules of Civ. Prac., Rule 4:88-8 (1948).
14 Washington State ex rel. Sperry v. Superior Court for Walla Walla
County, 41 Wash. 2d 670, 251 P. 2d 164 (1947).
15 Ibid.
16 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 40, § 901,
p. 86 (1960).
17 Anderson-Fribury Inc. v. Justin R. Clark & Son, 98 F. Supp. 75 (D. C.
N. Y. 1951); Weiss v. Doyle, 178 F. Supp. 566 (D. C. N. Y. 1955); Ivey v.
David, 17 F. R. D. 319 (D. C. N. Y. 1955).
'8 Bifferato v. States Marine Corp., 11 F. R. D. 44 (D. C. N. Y. 1941).
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of Florida because of his race. He requested that the court ad-
vance the case on its docket in order that he might be admitted
to the next term of the law school. The court held it to be in
the public interest to grant his request.19 As strikes frequently
affect the public interest, federal courts step in often. When
Vermont granite processors charged a conspiracy between dealers
and unions, and the strike had virtually paralyzed the industry,
the case was preferred and placed at the head of the calendar
for immediate trial.20
Generally, any good and sufficient cause should enable a trial
judge to grant preference. It rests first on the rules of the court
itself to regulate its own calendar, 21 and secondly on the judge's
sound legal discretion.22 Courts of review will not usually disturb
the trial courts' advancement of a case except for gross abuse of
judicial discretion, resulting in prejudice to one of the parties.23
In Illinois the record does not even have to show the grounds
on which the discretion was exercised; proper exercise being
assumed in the absence of a contrary showing.24
The most practical application of calendar preference should
be in the field of torts. If counsel can show "great hardship" due
to trial being delayed until its regular turn, this may be used as
argument for advancement.
"Great hardship" has been variously interpreted as old age,25
impending military service, 26 imminence of death, 27 destitution, 2s
and serious injuries.29
Old age is a term hard to pin down. Connecticut holds it to
be 65 years of age or older.30 But most other courts would
probably put it higher, into the 70's or 80's.31 A plaintiff's motion
19 Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 253 F. 2d 752 (C. A. 5, 1958).
20 Anderson-Fribury v. Justin R. Clark & Son, supra n. 17.
21 Smith-Hurd Illinois Anno. Stat., Prac. § 2-42. "Subject to (Supreme
Court) rules the city, county, circuit and appellate courts may make rules
regulating their dockets, calendars and business (1954).
22 Spitzer v. Schlatt, 249 Ill. 416, 94 N. E. 504 (1931).
23 Burdick v. Mann, 60 N. D. 710, 236 N. W. 340 (1931).
24 Spitzer v. Schlatt, supra n. 22.
25 Blank v. Medical Arts Center Hospital, 230 N. Y. S. 2d 792 (1962).
26 Relman v. Winer, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 867 (1941).
27 Thomas v. Green Bus Lines, Inc., 94 N. Y. S. 2d 489 (1950).
28 Rinzler v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 75 N. Y. S. 2d 867 (1947).
29 Bifferato v. States Marine Corp., supra n. 18.
30 Conn. Gen. Stat. Anno. § 2-192 (1947).
Sl Blank v. Med. Arts Center Hosp., supra, n. 25.
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for preference was granted where the plaintiff was 76 years of
age and he would be unlikely to survive a wait of up to six
years.32 In another case the plaintiff was 85, and had suffered
severe, disabling injuries. 33 Usually, though, there must be a
strong probability that the petitioner will not survive until time
of trial.
Destitution, as the term is employed in motions for pref-
erence, is held to mean that the petitioner is no longer able to
live except as a public charge.34 The mere fact that he is poor
doesn't entitle him to a preference. One court states that the
"mere showing of heavy indebtedness and presently lacking suf-
ficient income to meet current living expenses will not justify
the granting of a preference in granting a trial." 35 Yet in one
case where a husband was seriously injured and the wife sacri-
ficed her home life in order to earn living expenses, and the
amount earned was less than would have been allotted on relief,
the husband was entitled to a preference. 36 It is not necessary
for a person to dispose of all his assets, sell his home and go on
relief. It is only necessary that he be eligible for public welfare
relief in order to qualify for a preferred position on the docket.37
A corporation in a tort action was not entitled to a preference
on grounds of destitution in that it was no longer doing business
and owed debts which it was unable to pay, and that the suit
was its only asset.3
6
Imminence of induction into the armed services during war
time has resulted in a preference. The uncertainty of the length
of service, plus the possibility of being lost in action, would cer-
tainly be just grounds for preferment. 39 However, where a
soldier had been given an unexpected furlough from the armed
services, preference was denied because the other parties to the
suit would have been prejudiced, as they were unable to be ready
32 Ibid.
33 Bitterman v. 2007 Davidson Ave., 104 N. Y. S. 2d 81 (1961).
34 Holdridge v. Carter, 268 N. Y. S. 2d 411 (1951).
35 Cohen v. King's Toys & Stationery Store, 135 N. Y. S. 2d 688 (1952);
Utnicki v. City of New York, 139 N. Y. S. 2d 548 (1953); DiCarpio v. Babylon
Milk & Cream Co., 143 N. Y. S. 2d 38 (1955).
36 DiCarpio v. Babylon Milk, supra n. 35.
37 Bernstein v. Strammiello, 120 N. Y. S. 2d 490 (1952).
38 Knollwood Cocktail Lounge v. Edso Building Corp., 15 N. Y. S. 2d 951
(1939).
39 Relman v. Winer, supra n. 26.
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for trial within a few days.40 In another case where the plain-
tiff's attorney was about to be inducted into the service, the court
refused a preference. 41 It reasoned that the petitioner could
always find other counsel, just as competent.
Occasionally counsel is faced with the prospect that an aged
client may die before his case appears for hearing. In the early
common law, actions for torts affecting personal property were
made to survive the death of the plaintiff, and were maintainable
by his executor or administrator. This has been modified by all
American jurisdictions to some extent, if only to provide that
causes of action for injuries to all tangible property, personal and
real, shall survive the death of both parties.42 About half of
the states permit personal injury actions to survive. The follow-
ing states permit personal injury actions to survive the death of
either or both parties: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wyoming.
In Georgia, Missouri, Tennessee, and Texas it survives if the
action has been instituted before the death of one of the parties.
4 3
There is no point in belaboring the philosophy behind these
"Survival Statutes" for the essential problem of the client who
is unlikely to survive the pendency of the action is still there.
Most practicing attorneys with whom this author has discussed
this matter say that they simply take a deposition setting forth
the essential facts and then patiently wait for the case to come
to trial. Yet it seems hard to deny to any person for "his per-
sonal benefit and comfort the results of any cause of action for
the relatively short time left to him in life." 44 Connecticut, as
mentioned before, provides that actions brought by or against any
person sixty-five years old, or who reaches that age during the
pendency of the action, shall be granted a preference. 45 But this
is a rare exception.
In the older cases, an aged litigant was not necessarily
granted preference merely because he was not likely to survive
40 Ragan v. City of New York, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 893 (1943).
41 Kessler v. Chetcuti, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 375 (1942).
42 Prosser, Law of Torts, 708 (2d ed. 1951).
43 Evans, Survival of Tort Claims, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 969 (1931).
44 Blank v. Medical Arts Center Hosp., supra n. 25.
45 Conn. Gen. Stat. Anno., supra n. 6.
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until his case is reached in its regular order. 46 The controlling
case in New York for many years noted that, although a grant
of preference in the hearing of a case may be discretionary with
the court, a motion to advance had to be accompanied by a
showing of destitution and the strong probability of the death of
either the plaintiff or defendant. Here, although, plaintiff was
over sixty years old, and seriously injured, these facts alone did
not justify the granting of a preference. The reviewing court
laid down some ground rules which have been followed fairly
consistently by the other courts. Such factors as serious injury,
old age, inability to engage in gainful employment, high hospital
and medical expenses, or a reduced financial condition, are not
per se sufficient basis for a preference in the trial of a personal
injury case.47 But in a case where a female plaintiff was 76 years
old and received serious injuries in a taxicab, and it was shown
that she would be unlikely to survive the wait until her case came
to trial, she was entitled to a preference. 48 Again, where the
plaintiff was 68, and in the opinion of her physicians would not
survive the period of time which it would take her cause of ac-
tion to be reached for trial in its regular order, preference should
have been granted.49 In another personal injury action, where
the plaintiff was 75 years old and, in the opinion of her physician,
she would not survive until her trial was heard, trial preference
was properly granted.50 An affidavit by an attorney containing
only his conclusion that his plaintiff was financially destitute, and
the physician's affidavit which failed to state whether the injuries
were permanent, and whether in his opinion, based upon a suf-
ficient description of the facts, the plaintiff wouldn't survive until
the case was reached in its regular order, didn't justify a pref-
erence. 51
One of the more interesting interpretations of the holding
that imminent death was necessary for calendar preference was
based on the Connecticut statute.52 The County of New Haven
claimed that it was entitled to calendar preference on the ground
46 Healy v. Healy, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 874 (1950).
47 Ibid.
48 Hyman v. National Transportation Co., 22 N. Y. S. 2d 705 (1956).
49 1Vigliorsi v. R. K. O.-Keith-Orpheum Theatres, 148 N. Y. S. 2d 705 (1956).
50 Walsh v. Federated Department Stores, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 599 (1954).
51 Holdridge v. Carter, supra n. 34.
52 Conn. Gen'l Stat. Anno., supra n. 6.
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that the statute used the words "persons" and the county was a
"person," more than sixty-five years of age and about to "die"
(due to legislative action) on October 1, 1960, which would be
before the case could be heard on the regular schedule.5 3 The
court held that the intent of the legislature meant older human
litigants who might die or become incapacitated by age before
the regularly scheduled time for trial. There was no indication
that the word "persons" meant such an artificial being as a cor-
poration.
Recently the New York courts seem to have relaxed their
restrictive interpretation of old age as a basis for calendar pref-
erence. An eighty-five year old plaintiff had suffered disabling
and permanent injuries which resulted in protracted disability,
yet did not aver the possibility of immediate death. The court
held that old age alone was all that was necessary in order to
grant a preference. The court pointed out that the plaintiff should
receive whatever resulted from the cause of action for the short
time left to him in life.54 However, very recently the courts
have seemed to back off a little. A 73 year old woman who
suffered physical injuries was not entitled to preference because
of her advanced years. There was no claim of destitution or
other similar grounds. Her claim for preference was based solely
on an argument that the petitioner would not live until the time
of trial. The doctor stated, "It is my opinion with reasonable
medical certainty that the (plaintiff) 'may' not live to see the
trial of this action." The court held there must be an "un-
equivocal" showing that death is imminent, or that the petitioner
will not live until the time of trial. So there a preference was
an improvident exercise of discretion.55
A unique preference was recently granted for an hysterical
disability. The plaintiff was a passenger in the defendant's auto-
mobile and suffered brain injuries when the defendant suddenly
stopped. Physicians found her to be suffering from an acute
hysteric anxiety induced by the accident, which could not be
treated until her legal problem was settled. The court held that
the interests of justice would be served by an early trial.56
53 County of New Haven v. Porter, 194 Conn. 265, 164 A. 2d 236 (1960).
54 Blank v. Med. Arts Center Hosp., supra, n. 25.
55 Brier v. Plaut, 37 Misc. 2d 476 (N. Y. 1963).
56 Weinstein v. Levy, 239 N. Y. S. 2d 753 (1963).
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Even if there are grounds for a preference, the attorneys
for plaintiff and defense cannot stipulate that the case be placed
on the preferred calendar and expect the court to acquiesce. The
judge is permitted to exercise his own discretion as to the ar-
rangement of the court's calendar and conduct of the trial, and
therefore it is not necessarily error to reject the motion for ad-
vancement.
57
Basically it is difficult to see why the various situations men-
tioned above should not result in calendar preference. It seems
strange in this modem day that death should extinguish a cause
of action, or that, even if a jurisdiction has a survival act, a plain-
tiff should not have the benefit of his cause of action. The courts,
under their various rules of civil procedure, have a very large
discretion as to the order in which cases may be tried, and this
discretion will not ordinarily be interfered with by the review-
ing courts.58 In cases involving great hardship, and upon a proper
motion, the courts may advance cases on their trial calendars.
57 Wicks v. Wolcott, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 931 (1951).
58 Bingham v. Hill, 4 Ohio Dec. Repr. 144 (1878).
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